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CRIMINOLOGY
TO SERVE AND COLLECT:
MEASURING POLICE CORRUPTION
SANJA KUTNJAK IVKO VIC*
Stories of police corruption are cover-page news: they draw
public attention and sell the newspapers. As the recent examples
from Los Angeles' to Tokyo2 and from New York3 to Rio de Janeiro4
demonstrate, no police agency is completely free of corruption and
police officers-the "blue knights" entrusted and empowered to
enforce the law-can become some of the most aggressive criminals
themselves.
Learning how much corruption there is and understanding its
characteristics are both basic yet crucial steps toward successful
corruption control. Accurate information is necessary to diagnose the
extent and nature of the corruption problem, trace the changes in its
volume and patterns over time, determine the causes of corrupt
behavior, learn about the susceptibility of various types of corrupt
. Assistant Professor, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida State
University. S.J.D. in Criminal Law, Harvard Law School, 2002; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 1997; Ph.D. in Criminology, University of Delaware, 1995; M.A. in Criminology,
University of Delaware, 1992; LL.B., University of Zagreb Law School, 1987. 1 would like
to extend my sincerest gratitude to Professor Philip Heymann (Harvard Law School) and
Professor Mark H. Moore (J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) for
discussing the ideas in the paper and providing many useful comments and suggestions.
1 L.A. POLICE DEP'T, BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE RAMPANT AREA CORRUPTION
INCIDENT (2000).
2 Doug Struck, Japan's Police Wear Tarnished Badge of Honor, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
2000, at A23.
3 MILTON MOLLEN ET AL., COMMISSION REPORT: NEW YORK COMMISSION TO
INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES
OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT (1994) [hereinafter MOLLEN].
4 Stephen Buckley, Rio Police Officers Firedfor Corruption, WASH. POST, July 5, 2000,
at Al8.
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behavior to successful control, choose the required degree of
interference, design adequate control strategies and mechanisms,
estimate the resources necessary, determine the success of the
techniques used, and monitor agency performance in corruption
control over time.
A police administrator determined to engage in an extensive
reform and invest resources in corruption control without information
about the nature, extent, and organization of corruption in the agency
is likely wasting at least part of the resources, lowering the morale,
strengthening the code of silence, and raising doubts about his ability
to manage the organization. Moreover, without accurate
measurement of corruption, the degree of success of a reform is often
determined on the basis of its political appeal and the absence of
subsequent scandals, rather than on the true impact the reform has
had on the actual corruption in the agency.5
Despite its apparent significance and the vast resources invested
in the police, the measurement of police corruption-or, for that
matter, any other type of corruption-is surprisingly underdeveloped,
as illustrated by Jacobs:
Unlike for most other crimes, there are no official data on the corruption rate. How
much corruption is there? Is the rate rising or falling? Is there more corruption now
than in previous decades? Is there more corruption in one city than another, in one
government department than another? Has corruption decreased after passage of a
law, announcement of an investigation or arrests, or implementation of managerial
reforms? Corruption cannot be estimated by examining the Uniform Crime Reports or
the National Crime Victimization Survey. Thus, it cannot be determined whether any
particular anticorruption strategy or spate of strategies is working. We are data
deprived.6
Although no official nationwide data on police corruption are
available, the situation regarding measurement of corruption is
somewhat brighter than Jacobs claims it to be. In this paper, I draw
upon the available data to examine the extent and nature of police
corruption and provide a comprehensive analysis of the existing
methods for corruption measurement. Specifically, I discuss the
existing assessments of police corruption (conducted for a variety of
reasons, from performing cross-national comparisons, estimating the
investment risk, to smoothing the effects of a scandal), analyze the
5 See, e.g., James B. Jacobs, Dilemmas of Corruption Control, Presentation Before the
Department of Justice National Institute of Justice (May 18, 1999), in NATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: 1998-1999 LECTURE SERtES 73, 78 (1999).
6 Id. at 76.
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strengths and weaknesses of each methodological approach, and
elaborate on the extent to which these efforts show promise in the
measurement of key corruption-relevant issues. I argue that, while
each individual method (e.g., interviews, surveys, observations)
suffers from numerous drawbacks and is therefore highly problematic
when used as the sole source of corruption-related information,
methodological approaches that relied on combinations of various
methods have had more success in estimating the actual corruption
and should thus be regarded as superior.
I. PROBLEMS AT THE OUTSET
First, in the course of measuring police corruption it is crucial to
delineate what corruption is. Unfortunately, in most countries legal
statutes do not feature a crime specifically titled "corruption." Even if
it were not so, the definitions would probably vary at least as much as
the definitions of most crimes across the world do.7 Behavior
typically understood as "corruption" is classified as bribery and
extortion, but, depending on the legal system, it may also be
classified as theft, fraud, tax evasion, or racketeering.8 Some
countries "may not even define some of the acts (e.g., bribery) as
criminal at all."9 Similarly, what corrupt behavior is prohibited by
internal agency rules varies from agency to agency"° and across time
within the same agency. Thus, as challenging as measuring
corruption in a given agency at a given time undoubtedly is, making
any comparisons across space and time is inherently even more
difficult and riddled with problems that render any resulting
conclusions questionable and tentative at best.
Second, further dissecting the measurement of police corruption,
it turns out that defining who the police are is by no means less
challenging. Indeed, even some of the basic questions, such as who is
7 See, e.g., GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 20,43 (Graeme Newman ed., 1999).
8 See, e.g., PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES (William F. Weld ed., 1988).
9 Newman, supra note 7, at 20.
'0 The results of a study conducted by Barker and Wells in 1982 suggested that, among
the agencies that had written rules and regulations covering police misconduct, only one-
third of the agencies had rules dealing with corruption of authority (e.g., acceptance of a free
cup of coffee, free meals from restaurants, Christmas gifts), a sizeable minority of the
agencies (ranging from one-quarter to one-half) had no rules prohibiting serious corruption,
including kickbacks, opportunistic thefts, shakedowns, protection of illegal activities, traffic,
misdemeanor, or felony fix, involvement in direct criminal activities, and internal payoffs.
See Tom Barker & Robert 0. Wells, Police Administrators' Attitudes Toward the Definition
and Control of Police Deviance, 51 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 8-16 (1982).
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included in the definition of the police and how many police agencies
and police officers there are, remain controversial. For example, the
U.S. police force is highly decentralized, ranging in geographic
jurisdiction from federal and state to local (e.g., city, county), and in
subject jurisdiction from general-jurisdiction police to park,
university, or transit police, all the way to the most recent addition:
private police." Which of these police agencies should be classified
under "police" is a challenging question. For example, while the
President's Commission estimated that there were 40,000 state and
local police agencies in the United States in 1965,12 the Department
of Justice reported that there were only 20,000 police agencies in the
United States in 1980 (revised to 17,784 full-time state and local law
enforcement agencies). 3 Similarly, which employees-sworn, non-
sworn, reserve, recruits, Police Corps, full-time, part-time-are to be
counted also needs to be decided upon, although that decision is
somewhat less challenging: a typical calculation of the governmental
police force (once a decision is made as to which forces are to be
counted) includes sworn police officers. The number of sworn
personnel in the U.S. in 1965 was reportedly 371,000,14 and it rose to
663,535 in 1998." Needless to say, the problems related to this
aspect of measurement become even more complex in the
international, comparative arena. 6
The logical sources of information about corruption, not
surprisingly, are the people who know about it: police officers,
citizens, police organizations, and investigative agencies. The pivotal
question, and the third problem to be considered at the outset, is what
motivation would someone have to publicly reveal such information,
be they a participant in a corrupt transaction or an administrator in an
agency?
Obtaining information about corruption or gaining access to
study corruption in an agency will likely be burdened with serious
11 SAMUEL WALKER, THE POLICE IN AMERICA 39 (1992).
12 TASK FORCE ON THE POLICE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 7 (1967) [hereinafter THE
TASK FORCE].
13 BRIAN A. REAVES & MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2000).
14 THE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 7.
15 REAVES & HICKMAN, supra note 13.
16 For a summary of the related issues see Chris Lewis, Police Records of Crime, in
GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 43, 44.
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obstacles imposed by a variety of key players-the police officers,
union, 17 chief, 8 supervisors-whose agendas, although dissimilar in
many aspects and motivated by different incentives, may converge in
pursuit of the same specific common goal: disseminating as little
information about corruption as possible and, generally, keeping the
lid on the existing corrupt activities within the agency.
Generally, reports about corruption, if at all noticed by the
public,'9 may lead toward a scandal. When fueled by the "bad apple"
approach toward police corruption and zero-tolerance attitudes,
public reactions to a scandal often both generate requests for harsher
punishments and challenge the leadership's ability to manage the
agency. In such a climate, findings of corruption are perceived almost
exclusively as detrimental signs of the agency's lack of integrity.
Thus, police chiefs and police administrators have strong reasons for
their reluctance to talk about police corruption: it may be more
rational for the chief and the administration to sweep corruption
under the rug (rather than confront it publicly), deny its existence for
as long as possible, and, once corruption is discovered, downplay its
extent and importance as much as possible and swiftly punish a few
officers publicly accused of engaging in corrupt acts ("bad apples").2"
17 The Department of Justice three-state study of police ethics in the early 1990s
ultimately did not include Pennsylvania because of the pressures from the Fraternal Order of
Police in Pennsylvania. The Union applied strong pressure and encouraged police officers
not to participate. Consequently, the study was dropped in Pennsylvania before it even
began. Similarly, the Fraternal Order of Police in Chicago decided not to endorse the Illinois
project in Chicago. CHRISTINE MARTIN, ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL OFFICERS' PERCEPTION OF
POLICE ETHICS 1-2 (1994).
18 The NYPD was included in the original design of Reiss's LEAA-sponsored study of
three agencies. However, Commissioner Howard Leary was reluctant to cooperate and New
York was thus replaced with Boston. ANTHONY E. SIMPSON, THE LITERATURE OF POLICE
CORRUPTION 65 (1977).
19 Sherman studied corruption scandals and subsequent reforms in four cities. Although
the public plays an important role in the development of scandals, the public does not react
with outrage in each and every case. Sherman wrote that, in the period preceding the then
recent scandals, raising publicly even the more serious offense allegations did not result in
successful scandals leading toward a reform. LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND
REFORM xxiv (1978). Similarly, a quarter of a century later, the recent police corruption
scandal brewing in Los Angeles seems to have prompted a perhaps surprisingly mild
reaction from the general public. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, City Near Critical Choice
as City Officers Face Charges, L.A. TIMES, July 9, 2000, at Al. For a comment about the
community tolerance of police misconduct see Ralph C. Carmona, Commentary: Standing
Between Community and Chaos, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2000, at B9.
20 See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Sociological Theory of Police Corruption, in POLICE
CORRUPTION 6-12 (Lawrence W. Sherman ed., 1974); HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICE
CORRUPTION 6 (1975); KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION (1972)
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Police officers, bound by the nature of their occupation and the
paramilitary structure of the police, learn during the socialization
process that they need to turn a blind eye on misconduct by fellow
police officers, which in turn enables them to rely on their assistance
when they need it, and to earn their trust and support."' Regardless of
how severe and extensive the actual consequences of the violation of
the code of silence are22 and what is actually covered by the code in
an agency,23 the code seems to be shared by police officers 4 and its
presence has a serious impact on the police officers' willingness to
report misconduct by fellow police officers. Such a state of affairs
should not be surprising in light of the fact that, as is the case with
any other self-report studies,2 5 questions asked of police officers
about their own criminality and criminality of others, if answered
truthfully and later revealed, can entail serious ramifications, ranging
from internal discipline (including dismissal) to convictions on
felony charges.
Consequently, studying police corruption by asking police
officers about the extent and nature of corruption in their agencies is
more than likely to encounter resistance. A revealing example is the
[hereinafter KNAPP]; PENNSYLVANIA CRIME COMMISSION ON POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
QUALITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN PHILADELPHIA 392-95 (1974) [hereinafter
PENNSYLVANIA].
21 See, e.g., Ellwyn R. Stoddard, A Group Approach to Blue-Coat Crime, in POLICE
CORRUPTION, supra note 20, at 292.
22 Informal punishments for the violation of the code range from practical jokes to more
serious actions, such as burning the violator's locker, slashing their car tires, or threatening
them with physical harm. MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 54-55. Some of the more serious
consequences involve police officers left without help in the case of emergency.
Furthermore, they may receive the most dangerous assignments. See PENNSYLVANIA, supra
note 20. However, according to the experiences reported by Skolnick and Fyfe, the fear that
a compromised police officer will be left to himself by his peers in an emergency tends to be
exaggerated. See JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW 110 (1993).
23 See, e.g., CARL B. KLOCKARS ET AL., THE MEASUREMENT OF POLICE INTEGRITY 65-70
(1997).
24 See e.g., Thomas Barker, Peer Group Support for Police Occupational Deviance, 15
CRIMINOLOGY 353, 363 (1977); GAIL F. HUON ET AL., PERCEPTIONS OF ETHICAL DILEMMAS
19-20 (1995); KLOCKERS ET AL., supra note 23; DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., POLICE ATTITUDES
TOWARD ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY, (Nat'l Inst. of Justice
Research in Brief, 2000).
25 Self-report studies require the respondents to report their own criminal acts in a
confidential interview or in an anonymous questionnaire. Their main problems include
selection bias of the respondents, doubts about the truthfulness of the answers, and focus on
petty forms of criminality.
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survey of attendees at the FBI National Academy, one of the most
prestigious police academies in the United States.2" Under a
guarantee of confidentiality, a question in the survey asked of the
respondents-very experienced police officers, mostly supervisors
from a number of agencies across the United States-to provide
"specific examples of graft or corruption in [their] department,
without revealing names or places, and what [they] think could have
been done to prevent it."27 None of the 49 respondents provided an
answer.
Similarly to police officers, who do not have any motivation to
report their own lucrative and successful corrupt activities, citizens
who offered a bribe when caught violating the law are unlikely later
to report the incident. If a citizen made a rational decision that it is
better-in terms of finances, reputation, and emotional costs-to
bribe a police officer than to be officially processed,28 the citizen has
no reason to change that decision and to expose their own
involvement in not one, but two crimes, corruption probably being
the more serious of the two. On the other hand, a citizen who
perceived being forced into such an arrangement and being worse off
than in the absence of it29 may have a stronger motivation to disclose
the transaction. However, the motivation to report in itself is not a
sufficient prerequisite for the subsequent behavior; the force or abuse
of official position by the police displayed or threatened during the
transaction and the possible retribution for reporting may prompt the
citizen to be even more reluctant to report.3 °
26 LEE E. FABRIZIO, THE FBI NATIONAL ACADEMY: A STUDY OF THE CHANGE IN
ATTITUDES OF THOSE WHO ATTEND (1990).
27 Id. at 39, 65.
28 See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION: A STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 86
(1978); ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION 70 (1988).
29 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 28, at 53. Rose-Ackerman argues that the distinction
between bribery and extortion lies in "whether the payer receives 'better than fair treatment'
or must pay to be treated fairly." Similarly, Hailman wrote that in extortion the victim fears
economic loss, while in bribery the bribe "benefits both the bribe-taker, who likes it because
he gets the cash, but also the briber, because he gets the profit of the government
business .. " John R. Hailman, Corruption in Government Contracts: Bribery, Kickbacks,
Bid-Rigging and the Rest, in PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 8, at
20.
30 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
reported in 1967 that the police used various methods of discouraging citizens from filing a
complaint. One such technique included charging a complainant with filing a false report:
In one large eastern city, for example, the police department used to charge many of those who
filed complaints of police misconduct with filing false reports with the police. In 1962, 16 of 41
20031
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Thus, those who know about corruption-from police officers
and citizens who directly participate in corrupt transactions to police
chiefs and administrators who are accountable for the conduct of
their subordinates-have very few motives to make public the
information about corrupt acts they come across. In fact, they have a
diversified palette of motives to conceal any such information as
much as possible.
II. THE ACTUAL EXTENT AND NATURE OF CORRUPTION
The secretive nature of corrupt transactions and the lack of
incentives to release information about them render obtaining
accurate measurements-the actual number of corrupt incidents and
offenders, and the actual losses arising from corruption-a very
difficult task. The practical impossibility of measuring the true extent
and nature of corruption on the one hand and the pressing need to
obtain the relevant information on the other hand have prompted
social scientists to develop various methods of estimating the true
extent and nature of corruption: surveys, experiments, case studies,
interviews, and observations.
Unfortunately, regardless of its sophistication, when applied to
the measurement of the extent of corruption each of these methods in
itself is burdened with inherent methodological problems. Thus, the
quality of the research design and the limitations of each method
have a material impact on the outcome; the higher the internal and
external validity of the method, the greater the probability that the
resulting estimates are closer to the true extent and nature of
corruption. One approach toward enhancing the likelihood that the
persons (almost 40%) who filed complaints were arrested for filing false charges, in comparison
with the arrest of only 104 of 33,593 persons (0.3%) who filed similar charges against private
citizens.
THE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 195.
A decade later, the Knapp Commission also provided examples of retaliation for
submitting a complaint of police corruption. KNAPP, supra note 20. Furthermore, police
agencies typically sustain a very small percentage of the complaints (0 to 25%). See e.g.,
THE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 196; ANTHONY M. PATE ET AL., POLICE USE OF FORCE:
OFFICIAL REPORTS, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 117-118 (1993).
Although the situation appears to be gradually improving, the potential complainants still
face a number of obstacles, some of which are imposed by the police departments with the
purpose of discouraging false reporting (e.g., signed written statement, notarized statement,
warning about the false reporting). For an analysis of current policies in the Charleston
Police Department, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, and St. Petersburg Police
Department, see CARL B. KLOCKARS ET AL., ENHANCING POLICE INTEGRITY (2001).
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obtained estimates are a close approximation of the actual corruption
is triangulation:31 the use of several different methods. Indeed, while
much of the existing research relied on one method, independent
commissions and a few large research projects tended to use a
combination of methods.
Another approach toward enhancing the accuracy of the
findings, applied in survey methodology and qualitative studies, is to
use more than one category of respondents (e.g., surveying not only
police officers, but citizens as well). For expository convenience, I
organize the discussion around the methods and the studies that
employed them.
Figure 1 illustrates the levels at which corruption could be
measured, starting with the actual extent and nature of corruption
(bottom of Figure 1) and ending with the offenders sent to prison (top
of Figure 1). Although the true level of corruption should be
measured at the lowest level-all possible corrupt activities and
offenders-potentially useful information can also be obtained by
estimating corruption at various stages of the internal disciplinary
system and the criminal justice system. As suggested by Figure 1, in
the real world the number of cases and offenders decreases as they
move through the formal justice systems-both the internal formal
system of control in the agency and the larger criminal justice
system.
31 Marshall and Rossman define triangulation as "the act of bringing more than one
source of data to bear on a single point." CATHERINE MARSHALL & GRETCHEN B. ROSSMAN,
DESIGNING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 146 (1989).
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A. SURVEYS
1. Surveys of Police Officers
Surveys that ask police officers to report their own involvement
in corruption or that of their fellow officers are rare because it is not
only very difficult to gain access to police agencies, secure their
participation, and earn the trust of the police officers, but it is also
evident that the validity of the data obtained in such a way is doubtful
at best. Police officers have no incentives to report their own corrupt
activities and thus risk losing their job and/or facing prosecution in
criminal courts. Moreover, since they are accepted members of the
police subculture and are likely to share and support the code of
silence, they have no motive to report misconduct by their fellow
officers either, even if guaranteed confidentiality or anonymity by the
researchers.
Not surprisingly, because of the potential problems related to
validity and the challenges related to defining corruption and the
police, there is no survey, national or international,32 that could
ascertain, for example, whether "fewer police officers have reported
this year that they have engaged in corruption than they did last year"
or whether "the percentage of police officers in the Northeast who
reported that they engaged in corruption is smaller than in the South."
A recently released summary of the Police Foundation survey,
described by its authors as providing "the first national portrait of
police attitudes toward the abuse of authority,"33 contains no
questions about the frequency of corruption.
A few surveys of police officers inquired about the frequency of
corruption in their agencies. The challenges of asking police officers
to violate the code of silence are illustrated by a Department of
Justice study of police behavior.34 The original grant to the Ohio
Governor's Office of Criminal Justice Services was expanded to
include the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, but the
Fraternal Order of Police in Pennsylvania strongly pressured police
32 The first exploratory international self-report study has been conducted recently, but it
did not include police officers as respondents. See Graeme Newman & Gregory J. Howard,
Introduction: Data Sources and Their Use, in GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra
note 7, at 16.
33 WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 24, at 3.
34 See MARTIN, supra note 17.
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officers not to participate. Consequently, the study was aborted in
Pennsylvania before it even began.35 Similarly, the Fraternal Order of
Police in Chicago decided not to endorse the Illinois project in
Chicago, forcing the researchers in Illinois to exclude the Chicago
Police Department-representing approximately one-half of the full-
time municipal police force in Illinois-from the project.36
The Illinois study was based on a stratified random sample of
municipal police officers (N=861). The respondents were asked to
report what types of misconduct they most commonly observed
during the past year and during their whole career.37 The frequency of
perceived forms of corruption seemed to be related to their
seriousness: fewer than 0.4% of the respondents said that they saw a
police officer accepting a bribe, stealing property, or purchasing
stolen merchandise in the past year, while 81% of the police officers
said that they saw a police officer accepting free coffee or food from
a restaurant. 3' The socialization process and the participation in the
code of silence had a strong impact on the frequency with which the
respondents reported observing corruption: police officers with less
than one year of experience (i.e., those who had only limited
exposure to police work) were more likely to say that they had
witnessed a police officer accepting free coffee or food in the past
year than the more experienced police officers (especially those with
more than sixteen years of service).39
The corruption-related results of the Ohio study were quite
similar to the findings of the Illinois study: a representative sample of
Ohio police officers reported observing serious types of police
corruption (acceptance of a payment to overlook illegal activity,
purchase of stolen merchandise for personal use or gain) rather
infrequently (less than 0.6% observed it in the previous year; less
than 4.7% observed it during their careers), while they reported
observing police officers accepting free coffee or food from
3 Id. at 1-2.
36 Id. at 4.
17 Id. at 32.
38 Id. at 33.
39 Id. at 42. To a certain extent, the differences could probably be explained by the
officers' ranks. The percentage of police officers and first-line supervisors who said that they
had observed an acceptance of free coffee or food in the previous year was higher than that
of detectives/investigators, mid-level supervisors, or administrators. Id. at 46. Police
officers and first-line supervisors, by the very nature of their assignments, probably have
more opportunities to observe such behavior than mid-level supervisors or administrators do.
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restaurants quite frequently (71% observed it over the course of the
previous twelve months; 87.3% observed it during their careers).4"
A survey of six police agencies, conducted by McCormack and
Fishman in 1978, used a different approach. The authors wanted to
test the degree of "police improbity" (behavior that can be considered
unethical, dishonest, or corrupt). 41 At the outset, the six police
agencies were classified according to their reputation for integrity
into predominantly clean agencies, predominantly corrupt agencies,
and agencies that have undergone a recent reform. McCormack and
Fishman provided their respondents with five hypothetical scenarios
(ranging from the acceptance of free meals and discounts to
kickbacks and thefts from the crime scene) and asked them to
estimate the proportion of their police force engaging in such
behavior. Based on a sample of 755 police officers, the authors found
that even in the cleanest of the six departments a certain percentage
of police officers, though smaller than in the departments perceived
as corrupt, engaged in such behavior.4 At the same time, even in the
departments the research team and their Advisory Board Members
classified as having serious corruption problems, police officers
reported that, with the exception of the acceptance of free meals and
discounts, "very few" of their fellow officers engaged in such
misconduct. The authors concluded that, "in most departments a very
low level of corruption superficially appears to exist."43
Given the sampling techniques and the methodology, the results
of the studies that (at least on the surface) managed to convince
police officers to describe the extent of police corruption in their
police agencies are thus at best limited to the populations from these
agencies. Consequently, in the absence of a representative sample,
the results cannot be extended to other agencies or generalized to
apply to the whole police force in a particular region or nation.
Furthermore, the police officers' answers, potentially impacted by the
self-serving bias44 and the fear of drastic consequences for the
40 JEFFREY J. KNOWLES, THE OHIO POLICE BEHAVIOR STUDY (1996).
41 JANET E. FISHMAN, MEASURING POLICE CORRUPTION 9 (1978).
42 Id. at 28-33.
43 Id. at 26.
44 See, e.g., L. Larwood & W. Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving Bias in
Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194 (1977); N. D. Weinstein, Unrealistic
Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Ola
Svenson, Are We Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 4.7 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981).
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violations of the code of silence, tend to point further away from the
true rate of involvement in corruption.
In an attempt to lessen the impact of the code of silence, Barker
asked only police rookies (i.e., inexperienced police officers) to
report on the frequency of corruption in their agencies."a This
approach is not without drawbacks either: a certain period of time
necessarily has to pass before rookies will have had sufficient
opportunities to observe misconduct and, during that period, rookies
are not immune from socialization into the police subculture, which
in turn makes them more susceptible toward accepting the code of
silence. The rookies in Barker's sample had an average of ten months
of experience.4 6 At least two-thirds of the surveyed rookies responded
that none of the police officers in their agencies had engaged in
corruption (e.g., a case fix, opportunistic thefts, shakedowns, direct
criminal activities, or internal corruption), with the notable
exceptions of corruption of authority and kickbacks.47 Put differently,
the results indicate that between 9% and 31% of the novice police
officers said that at least some of their fellow officers engaged in
serious corruption.48
2. Surveys of Citizens
Citizens, including the general public as well as specific
segments of the public (such as restaurant owners), are another
source of data about corruption. Some of them have experienced
corruption as participants, while others might have observed corrupt
transactions by others. Analyzing aggregate answers about the
citizens' own involvement in corruption (as bribe-givers) and
especially, if possible, by comparing them with the police officers'
answers, can yield a better estimate of the actual corruption.
4' Tom Barker, Rookie Police Officers' Perceptions of Police Occupational Deviance, 6
POLICE STUD. 6 (1983).
46 The range of experience for the surveyed 271 rookie police officers from 71 police
agencies and 21 sheriffs departments (who attended a police academy in one southern state)
was from I month to 72 months, with a mean of 10 months. Id. at 32-33. The term "rookie"
may be misleading in this case; one would assume rookies to be inexperienced police
officers who are just starting their careers in law enforcement (or in that agency).
Interestingly, in Barker's sample of "rookies" there were 2 corporals, 12 sergeants, 3
lieutenants, and 5 assistant chiefs. Barker explained that, "in the region served by this
particular academy it is quite common to find individuals employed at the rank of what one
would consider a superior officer in a larger department." Id.
41 Id. at 34.
48 Id.
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Citizens were typically included as respondents in two types of
surveys: those asking about the honesty of the police and those
asking about the extent of corruption among the police. A problem
with the first type of citizen surveys is that public attitudes can be
based on an unobservable mix of their actual experiences and their
general opinions about the police (which can be shaped in significant
part by the media or by a few highly publicized cases).49
Furthermore, to protect their own behavior which constitutes a
violation of legal rules, both citizens and police officers can try to
project the "socially acceptable" image instead of revealing their
actual opinion, especially if doing so would yield a picture contrary
to the expected.
Surveys have indicated that the public both has positive
impressions of police officers' ethical standards 0 and estimates the
police to be among the occupations with the highest ethical
standards.5 ' For example, Gallup Polls have consistently reported
over the last two decades that between 40% and 50% of the surveyed
citizens evaluate the honesty and ethical standards of the police to be
either "very high" or "high."
5 2
However, estimates of police honesty appeared to be related to
the respondent's race; starting from the National Opinion Research
Center survey and the Louis Harris poll conducted for the President's
Commission in the 1960s," African-American respondents generally
evaluated police performance and integrity in more negative terms
than Caucasian respondents did:
The NORC survey disclosed that sharp differences exist as to how citizens view
police honesty. About two-thirds of whites, but only one-third of [blacks] thought the
police to be 'almost all honest;' less than 2 percent of whites thought that they were
'almost all corrupt' in comparison to 10 percent of nonwhites. A Louis Harris poll in
49 See J. R. Lasley, The Impact of the Rodney King Incident on Citizen Attitudes Toward
Police, 3 POLICING & Soc'y 245 (1994) for a description of the impact of one highly-
publicized case (the Rodney King case) on the attitudes of the public in South Central Los
Angeles.
50 See, e.g., Scott H. Decker, Citizen Attitudes Toward the Police: A Review of Past
Findings and Suggestionsfor Future Policy, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 80 (1981); BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1997, at 115 (1998) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 1997].
SI SOURCEBOOK 1997, supra note 50, at 113.
52 Id. at 115.
53 THE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 146-48.
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1966 found that approximately 15 percent of [blacks] (almost four times as many as
whites) believed that many police officers in their communities took bribes.54
The more recent surveys suggest that the public still tends to
have a relatively positive opinion about police honesty, while, at the
same time, it perceives that police officers frequently engage in
corruption. For example, a survey of citizens in Philadelphia in 1987
revealed that the public provided very positive ratings of the police
service despite the fact that one-third of the respondents thought that
police officers often took bribes." On the eve of one of the most
recent corruption scandals in New York, a New York Times poll in
1994 showed that, while 93% of the surveyed citizens perceived that
corruption is either "widespread" or at best "limited," approximately
one-half of the surveyed citizens estimated that the police are doing a
"good" or an "excellent" job.56 Another poll conducted in June of
1994 indicated that citizens had a more positive opinion about the
average police officer in New York than about the New York Police
Department as a whole: while 73% of the citizens stated that the
average police officer was "very" or "somewhat honest," 43% of the
citizens perceived that there was widespread corruption in the
Department.17 Once again, African-American and Hispanic citizens
were more likely to say that corruption was widespread than
Caucasian citizens were. 8
Overall, then, the results of citizen surveys provide quite a
divergent picture about police corruption, from fewer than 2% of
Caucasian respondents nationwide who perceived in the 1960s that
most of the police were corrupt,59 to 22% of respondents in the "Bay
City" area in California in the 1970s who thought that there was at
least some bribery of the police, 60 to 93% of New Yorkers in the
1990s who perceived corruption to be widespread. 1
" Id. at 148.
55 MARK MOORE, Epilogue to POLICE INTEGRITY: PUBLIC SERVICE WITH HONOR 62
(1997).
56 C. Krauss, Poll Finds a Lack of Faith in the Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, at Al.
57 WCBS-TV/New York Times poll in June 1994, cited in RUDOLF W. GIULIANI &
WILLIAM J. BRATTON, POLICE STRATEGY No. 7: ROOTING OUT CORRUPTION; BUILDING
ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT 22 (1995).
" Id. at 23.
59 THE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 148.
60 Thomas J. Crawford, Police Perceptions of Ghetto Hostility, I J. POLICE SCI. &
ADMIN. 168, 170 (1973).
61 Krauss, supra note 56.
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Similarly, surveys of citizens across the world suggest that
perceptions about the extent and nature of corruption differ widely.
For example, Bayley reported in 1974 about public perceptions of
corruption in India: between one-quarter and one-half of the
respondents, depending on the part of the country and the type of
population (urban/rural), said that there is a "great deal" of corruption
among the police.62 At the same time, Judge reported that the public
relations surveys conducted in the United Kingdom indicated that the
majority of the respondents, although they evaluated the police in
positive terms, thought that the police officers occasionally accepted
bribes.63
Several studies of public opinion were conducted recently, in the
1990s. A community survey of New South Wales in Australia
revealed that, while three-quarters of the respondents believed that
there was corruption in the NSW Police Service, the majority (79%)
felt that the number of corrupt police officers was "low" or "very
low."64 When Australian respondents in a different study were asked
about the frequency with which police officers accept gratuities, 14%
reported that, "they had observed a police officer being offered a
gratuity and 12% said they had observed an officer accepting a
gratuity."6
One of the public opinion surveys with the widest coverage is
the Gallup International 50th Anniversary Survey.66 Citizens in 37
countries were asked to estimate the extent of corruption by various
public officials, including the police.67 Although only approximately
one-third of the respondents in the West European countries and
Israel reported that police corruption was widespread, that
62 David Bayley, Police Corruption in India, in POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 20, at
74, 76.
63 Anthony Judge, Police Corruption in England, in POLICE CORRUPTION, supra note 20,
at 94, 95.
64 Cited in NADIA BONI, PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE AND POLICING: A REVIEW OF PUBLIC
AND POLICE SURVEYS 31 (1995).
65 Tim Prenzler & Peta MacKay, Police Gratuities: What the Public Think, 14 CRAM.
JUST. ETHICS 15, 23 (1995).
66 Gallup International, Gallup International 50th Anniversary Survey (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
67 The question in the Gallup International Survey asked the respondents: "From the
following groups of people, can you tell me for each one of them, if there are a lot of cases
of corruption given, many cases of corruption, few cases or no cases of corruption at all."
Police officers were included among the nine categories listed (politicians, trade unionists,
public officials, policemen, businessmen, judges, ordinary citizens, clergy/priests, and
journalists). Id.
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assessment was shared by over two-thirds of the respondents in the
East European countries, the Far Eastern countries, and the Central
and South American countries. However, while these regional
averages illustrate the extent of the differences across the globe, they
also conceal substantial differences within each region. For example,
while on average one-third of the respondents in the fourteen West
European countries characterized police corruption as widespread,
the percentage of respondents differed from as low as 9% in Finland
and 11% in Denmark to as high as 61% in Turkey and 73% in
Belgium. 6
8
Another approach in the survey methodology is to ask citizens to
report incidents in which they had offered a bribe to police officers or
were victims of corruption. Interestingly, although the Department of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics69 has been conducting the
National Crime Victimization Survey on representative samples of
U.S. households for over a quarter of a century, none of the questions
asks about victimization by the police or participation in corruption.
The first international self-report study was conducted recently,
but the respondents, members of the general public from twelve
countries aged fourteen to twenty-one, were not asked about their
own corrupt behavior.7° However, despite its origin and primary
orientation toward the questions related to the respondents'
victimization, another survey-the International Crime Victim
Survey7 (ICVS)-contains a few self-report questions related to
corruption.72 Specifically, in addition to asking the respondents
whether they had been asked for a bribe in the previous year, the
questionnaire also inquires about the governmental agency to which
68 Id.
69 See e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992 (1994).
70 Newman & Howard, supra note 32, at 16.
71 JAN J. VAN DIJK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME VICTIM SURVEYS 1989-1997 (1997).
72 Corrupt behavior may include participants not equally willing to engage in corruption.
Although some participants can initiate corrupt transactions themselves, most of the
participants share one common feature: the police officers who caught them violating the
law (the original crime), to whom they may have offered or are considering offering a bribe
(the new crime), have at their disposal the implicit threat of enforcing the law or even
abusing the law in order to obtain compliance. Related legal decisions in federal courtrooms
rest on that principle: the prosecutor need not prove force or a threat of using force in order
to have a defendant convicted of extortion; rather, proving that a police officer received
money because of his office will suffice. H. Marshall Jarrett, Charging Decisions, in
PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES, supra note 8, at 213.
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the bribe seeker belonged to.73 Combining the answers to these two
questions offers a crude estimate of the percentage of the respondents
who said that they had paid a bribe to a police officer last year in a
particular country.
Three sweeps of the survey have been conducted over the course
of eight years; they include 93 surveys in 56 countries with a total of
136,464 interviews.74 As an integral part of a large study on police
attitudes,75 I use a data set drawn from the most recent survey sweep
available (1996/1997) to conduct the analyses reported below. The
data set contains city samples drawn in forty-one countries from six
continents.76
It is apparent that the estimated extent and nature of corruption
display formidable variation throughout the world.7  Of the
respondents who said that they had been asked to pay a bribe last
year, the percentage of those who said that they had paid a bribe to a
police officer varies from almost 0% in the Netherlands, Switzerland,
France, or Sweden, to 71% in Argentina. 78 The fact that 100% of the
respondents from the United States who said that they had paid a
bribe had paid it to a police officer 79 is an excellent example of the
problems with the validity of survey methodology. Since the
behavior studied appears to be quite rare in the United States (1.5%
of the respondents said that they had paid a bribe), further breakdown
of bribe payers (by the type of officials to whom the bribe was paid)
relies upon a very small number of respondents. Therefore, assuming
that the sampling procedures produced representative samples,
countries in which a higher percentage of the respondents said that
they had bribed a police officer exhibit a smaller margin of error and
thus probably have a higher degree of internal validity. In the
instances in which percentages are very small, the question to what
degree these percentages generalize to the entire population remains
unanswered.
73 ICVS WORKING GROUP, INTERNATIONAL CRIME VICTIM SURVEYS C14A 100, C14A300
(1997).
74 Jan J. van Dijk, The Experience of Crime and Justice, in GLOBAL REPORT ON CRIME
AND JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 25.
75 Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovid, Opinions About the Police in Democratic Countries and
Countries in Transition: An Analysis of the International Crime Victim Survey Data (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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A cross-country comparison of the percentage of respondents
who said that they had been asked to pay a bribe to a police officer
(out of all the respondents) also yields interesting implications about
the perceived extent of police corruption across the world. A very
small percentage of the respondents from Western democracies (1%
or less), reported paying a bribe to the police, while the percentages
are dramatically higher (between 10% and 20%) in some East
European, Asian, and Latin American countries. Broadly speaking,
the countries with the reputation in the international business
community of being more corrupt,8" as indicated by a low score on
the 1999 Corruption Perception Index (CPI)" (reported in Table 1),
appear also to have a higher percentage of the respondents who said
that they had been asked to pay a bribe to a police officer last year.
82
80 The G6ttingen University and Transparency International jointly developed the
Corruption Perception Index that provides a composite score for each country. The score
suggests the corruption-related reputation of each country in the international business
community. A high score (close to ten) indicates that the country is perceived as relatively
clean of corruption, while a low score (close to one) indicates that the country is perceived
as having serious corruption problems. See http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/icr.htm.
8' The Corruption Perception Index (CPI), developed by the Transparency International,
is a combination of data from seventeen sources compiled by ten institutions. Johann Graf
Lambsdorff, The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1999.
Framework Document (1999), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi/l999/cpi
_framework or in PDF format at http://www.gwdg.de/-uwvw/1999_CPIFD.pdf. Most of
the sources (ranging from the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy to "International
Working Group") utilize instruments that target the frequency of corruption in general. For
example, the World Competitiveness Yearbook by the Institute for Management
Development features the item "Improper practices (such as bribing or corruption) prevail or
do not prevail in the public sphere." The Asian Intelligence Issue by the Political &
Economic Risk Consultancy asks "To what extent does corruption exist in the country in
which you are posted in a way that detracts from the business environment for foreign
companies." The Private Sector Survey by the World Bank/Basel University asks two
corruption-related questions: "Please judge on a six point scale how problematic [corruption
is] for doing business," and "It is common for firms in my line of business to have to pay
some irregular 'additional payments' to get things done. This is true always, mostly,
frequently, sometimes, seldom or never." Id. Only two sources-the ICVS and the Gallup
International-ask specifically about the frequency of police corruption.
82 The CPI is a composite score of over a dozen surveys, only one of which is the ICVS
(a country is assigned a CPI score if it had participated in at least five different surveys).
Therefore, the non-linear negative relationship between the percentages reported in the third
and fourth columns of Table I (Pearson's correlation coefficient, r = -0.58, ordinarily
intended to measure the strength of linear relationships, provides a useful but conservative
estimate of the strength of this relationship) is not trivially induced by the construction of the
CPI, since the bulk of the weight entered into the CPI comes from other surveys. Moreover,
the impact of the part of CPI that comes from the ICVS (the first column of Table 1) on the
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In addition to the International Crime Victim Surveys-a major
endeavor supported by researchers from over fifty countries around
the globe-several research teams conducted self-report studies of
the general public in a limited number of countries. For example,
Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina recently studied the use of
presents and bribes in Eastern Europe83 (the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine). Instead of asking about their own
corrupt activities, the respondents were asked about corrupt behavior
in hypothetical terms. The majority of the respondents in Slovakia,
Bulgaria, and Ukraine (64%, 72%, and 89%, respectively) and close
to one-half in the Czech Republic (42%) said that a person seeking
something to which he or she is entitled by law would have to offer
money, a present, or a favor to the police.
84
Most of the existing surveys focus on one country and are
conducted locally, usually with the purpose of surveying the
population of a particular city. For example, based on a sample of
116 citizens surveyed in Reno, Nevada, Sigler and Dees found that
approximately one-half of the respondents said that, "if [they] run a
small business, such as a coffee shop or a movie theater, [they would]
offer police officers free gifts such as coffee, meals, or free movie
tickets."85 Interestingly, one-third of those who said that they would
offer gratuities to the police also said (explicitly) that they would
expect special favors in return.86
described relationship is further attenuated by the construction of the percentage of the
respondents who paid a bribe to apolice officer last year (the third column of Table 1).
83 William L. Miller et al., Are the People Victims or Accomplices? The Use of Presents
and Bribes to Influence Officials in Eastern Europe, 29 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 273
(1998).
84 Id. at 278.
85 Robert T. Sigler & Timothy M. Dees, Public Perception of Petty Corruption in Law
Enforcement, 16 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 14, 18 (1988).
86 Id. at 18.
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Table 1
ICVS Survey Results on Bribe Payment
Respondents Respondents asked to
asked to pay last Percentage paying pay a police officer last CPI 1999
year to a police officer year score
Canada 0.8% 20.0% 0.16% 9.2
USA 1.5% 100.0% j 1.50% 7.5
Austria 1.5% 50.0% 0.75% 7.6
England & Wales 0.2% 0.0% 0.00% 8.6
France 2.9% 0.0% 0.00% 6.6
Malta 4.3% 21.7% 0.93% -
Netherlands 0.7% 0.0% 0.00% 9.0
Scotland 0.6% 0.0% 0.00% 8.6
Sweden 0.4% 0.0% 0.00% 9.4
Switzerland 0.0% 0.0% 0.00% 8.9
Albania 14.0% 8.1% 1.13% 2.3
Belarus 12.5% 20.9% 2.61% 3.4
Bulgaria 19.3% 54.6% 10.54% 3.3
Chechnia 9.1% 26.2% 2.38% -
Croatia 15.4% 44.4% 6.84% 2.7
Estonia 4.0% 36.4% 1.46% 5.7
Georgia 30.6% 30.0% 9.18% 2.3
Hungary 3.9% 34.5% 1.35% 5.2
Latvia 14.3% 12.1% 1.73% 3.4
Lithuania 13.4% 32.6% 4.37% 3.8
Macedonia 7.7% 9.3% 0.72% 3.3
Poland 7.7% 30.7% 2.36% 4.2
Romania 12.0% 13.6% 1.63% 3.3
Russia 19.0% 52.1% 9.90% 2.4
Slovak Rep. 14.1% 32.7% 4.61% 3.7
Slovenia 1.5% 18.8% 0.28% 6.0
Ukraine 12.9% 25.6% 3.30% 2.6
Yugoslavia 17.5% 40.5% 7.09% 2.0
India 23.3% 18.3% 4.26% 2.9
Indonesia 33.8% 52.2% 17.64% 1.7
Kyrgyz Rep. 21.8% 24.0% 5.23% 2.2
Mongolia 5.2% 14.8% 0.77% 4.3
Philippines 4.6% 34.0% 1.56% 3.6
Botswana 3.0% 21.1% 0.63% 6.1
South Africa 7.6% 46.1% 3.50% 5.0
Zimbabwe 7.2% 30.6% 2.20% 4.1
Argentina 29.3% 71.4% 20.92% 3.0
Bolivia 26.0% 43.6% 11.34% 2.5
Brazil 17.9% 49.7% 8.90% 4.1
Costa Rica 11.1% 23.7% 2.63% 5.1
Paraguay 13.8% 28.4% 3.92% 2.0
Average l[ 12.6% 36.4% [ 4.59% I
3. Surveys of Various Types of Respondents
Surveying a variety of respondents-police officers, members of
the public, and citizens who participate in corrupt activities-can
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help increase the validity of the results.87 The most elaborate surveys
of this kind, designed by the World Bank Institute, have the purpose
of identifying the prevalence of corruption (including police
corruption) and its causes, as well as its social and economic costs.
Surveys of households, businesses, and public officials within the
same country serve as diagnostic tools to provide guidance on the
extent, nature, causes, and costs of corruption in a particular country
and can be used to measure the effects of subsequent anti-corruption
reforms. According to the World Bank, to date these surveys "are
being or have been implemented with assistance from the World
Bank in numerous countries including Albania, Georgia, Latvia,
Russia, Slovakia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Thailand, Benin,
Ghana, [Cambodia,] and Nigeria."88
Although designed (1) to decrease the likelihood of non-replies
by attributing the guilt to the other party in the transaction (e.g.,
citizens were asked about the instances in which they were requested
to pay; public officials were asked about the situations in which the
enterprises offered bribes)89 or by avoiding asking the respondents
about their own corrupt behavior and instead asking about their
knowledge regarding corruption (e.g., public officials were not asked
about their own corrupt activities) and (2) to increase the likelihood
that the results are an accurate measurement by including three
groups of respondents (citizens, enterprises, and public officials), the
questionnaires are not free from methodological problems. Some of
the problems are: (1) the accuracy of citizens' perceptions may
depend to a large degree upon their actual experience with a
87 For example, if one were to reach conclusions based only on the answers provided by
the officials in the Cambodian public officials survey, one would conclude that corruption is
not widespread (unofficial payments received in 10% or less of their contacts). However,
when the results from the Cambodian household survey and enterprise survey are considered
as well, it becomes clear that public officials probably underestimated the extent of
corruption. In particular, citizens and enterprises estimated the frequency of bribes to occur
in at least 40% of the contacts (53% for urban households, 43% for rural households, 44%
for domestic enterprises, and 68% for foreign enterprises). WORLD BANK, CAMBODIA:
GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION DIAGNOSTIC: EVIDENCE FROM CITIZEN, ENTERPRISE AND
PUBLIC OFFICIAL SURVEYS 14 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/
governance/diagsurveys.htm.
88 Id. at iii. Reports available at the World Bank web-site presently include Albania,
Cambodia, and Latvia.
89 JAMES ANDERSON, REPORT: CORRUPTION IN LATVIA: SURVEY EVIDENCE 9 (1998),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/govemance/diag-surveys.htm.
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particular form of corruption;9° (2) the respondents can have a
tendency to underestimate their own corrupt activities or those by
their colleagues;9" (3) the overall percentage of public officials
selected from each agency can be small;92 and (4) the percentage of
public officials who provided an answer to a question probing into
the nature of corruption in their agencies can be small. 93
While a substantial portion of the questionnaires focuses on
corruption in general, each questionnaire also features a section
examining the prevalence and typical forms of police corruption.
Respondents in the household survey and the enterprise survey are
asked about the overall honesty of the police and the quality of their
services, the frequency of contacts with the police, and the size and
frequency of unofficial payments requested by the police. In addition
to providing estimates related to police corruption itself, these
questions enable comparisons between the police and other
governmental offices in terms of perceptions of their overall honesty,
extent and nature of corruption, and reporting practices.
90 The results from the household sample in Latvia clearly indicate that the perceptions
about the extent ofjudicial corruption varied with the respondents' experience:
Although corruption seems to be accepted as "normal" by much of the population, the surveys
suggest that the public perception may be worse than the reality. In the case of the judiciary, for
example, households perceived that bribes were required 30 to 40 percent of the time ... yet
only 14 percent of the households that were involved in court cases actually received some
indication that a bribe was desired.
ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 49.
9' Perhaps not surprisingly, public officials in the Latvian sample reported that the
frequency of various types of corruption was quite different in their own agency than in
other agencies:
Estimates of the percentage of officials who pay to acquire their positions range from 15 percent
for investigators and prosecutors to 43 percent for customs officials. The estimates of the
percentage of officials who take jobs because they expect unofficial benefits are even higher, 31
percent for investigators and prosecutors, and 64 percent for customs officials.
Id. at 43-46. Anderson attached the following footnote to the text above:
Surveyed public officials gave lower estimates for officials in their own positions, saying that
only 8 percent pay to acquire their jobs, and only 16 percent take the jobs because they expect
unofficial benefits. This could imply that their perceptions of corruption within other
organizations is exaggerated or it could reflect their own fear of revealing the level of corruption
within their own organization.
Id. at 46 n.28.
92 In the Latvian sample of public officials there were only 218 respondents from various
state institutions. Id. at 9.
93 Although the Cambodian sample of public officials consisted of 671 public officials,
less than one-third of all the respondents answered questions describing how the unofficial
payments are shared within the agency.WORLD BANK, CAMBODIA, supra note 87, at 17.
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The reports currently available reveal some interesting patterns.
Specifically, the results from the Latvian study indicate that the
traffic police, which citizens, businesses, and public officials alike94
evaluated as one of the most corrupt agencies in the country,
extracted bribes when given the opportunity more frequently than
other governmental agencies in Latvia (33% of the time according to
the enterprises and 39% of the time according to the households). 95
Regular police were perceived as somewhat more honest96 and did
not top the list of Latvian agencies most likely to extract bribes.
According to the samples of households, enterprises, and public
officials, the Cambodian police ("law enforcement and securities")
were also evaluated as being among the more corrupt governmental
agencies.97 Although the frequency of contact with the police was not
high (11-15% of the households and 16-31% of the enterprises had a
contact last year), the frequency of bribes given the opportunity (i.e.,
contact), was reportedly extremely high (80% or more).98 Thus, the
frequencies of informal payments to the traffic police and to the
regular police were among the highest of all Cambodian
governmental institutions.99 Similarly, the Albanian enterprises
estimated that the traffic police were among the most corrupt
governmental agencies."' 0 In particular, "more than 50% of the firms
that use the following governmental services [one of which is the
traffic police] admit that bribes are a part of the delivery of the
service."'' °
B. EXPERIMENTS
Scientific experiments-techniques in which "an investigator
introduces a change into a process and makes measurements or
observations in order to evaluate the effects of the change" 102 -are
rather rare in the study of police corruption. Random integrity tests
conducted by a formal internal system of control tend to resemble
94 ANDERSON, supra note 89, at 16.
9' Id. at 13.
96 Id. at 16.
97 WORLD BANK, CAMBODIA, supra note 87, at 13.
98 Id. at 15.
99 Id. at 15.
'00 World Bank, Evidence of Corruption: Main Lessons, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/guidepdfs/albania.pdf.
101 Id.
102 FREDA ADLER ET AL., CRIMINOLOGY 23 (1995).
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experiments; they are conducted with the intent to induce the same
change for each "participant" in the "experiment" and to allow the
"researchers" to observe the subject's reaction. However, unlike
questionnaires, which utilize hypothetical cases, random integrity
tests are conducted in real-life conditions. In fact, they are usually
modeled to resemble previous realistic cases as closely as possible.
Moreover, proactive investigations are not scientific
experiments; while experiments are controlled scientific explorations
of human behavior, proactive investigations are fact-finding missions
that have serious real-world consequences: a police officer may be
fired if he took the money from the wallet planted on the back seat of
his cruiser.
In the aftermath of the Mollen Commission, part of the effort
made by the New York Police Department to deal with corruption
included random integrity tests. 0 3 Instead of targeting specific
officers under suspicion, these tests were "targeted on the basis of
statistical information, indicating precincts and tours of duty that
might be prone to corruption."' 4 The results of random integrity tests
can serve as another measure of corruption, as noted by the former
New York City Mayor Giuliani and the former NYPD Commissioner
Bratton:
IAB will significantly expand its random and targeted integrity testing programs over
the next year. The goal is to conduct sufficient integrity tests to establish a statistically
valid sample of police corruption in the NYPD. There will be tests conducted on all
tours and in all precincts. The base line established by integrity testing will be
compared with integrity testing results in future years as one means to gauge the rise
or decline of corrupt activity among police officers.
10 5
Since most formal internal systems of control typically perform
reactive functions °6  and, moreover, publicizing information
103 See GIULIANI & BRATTON, supra note 57, at 41.
'04 Id. at 42.
'05 Id. at 42.
106 For example, the Knapp Commission and the Pennsylvania Crime Commission
investigated police agencies characterized by widespread corruption. Both commissions
reported that the departments they investigated-the NYPD and the Philadelphia Police
Department, respectively--did not utilize proactive techniques to control corruption.
KNAPP, supra note 20, at 208, 217-18; PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 483. The Mollen
Commission, which investigated the NYPD two decades after the Knapp Commission,
pointed out that the NYPD pursued a decidedly proactive approach for every investigation of
organized and continuing criminal activity (e.g., drug dealing or prostitution) except for
police corruption. MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 13. On the other hand, Deputy Police
Commissioner John J. Norris, head of the Internal Affairs Unit within the Philadelphia
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regarding corruption is often not aligned with the incentives provided
to various members of the agency, the data describing the use of
proactive investigations are generally unavailable.
Nevertheless, I provide two examples from the NYPD. Both
integrity checks were conducted shortly after the respective scandals
and investigations by independent commissions (the Knapp
Commission in the 1970s and the Mollen Commission in the 1990s).
Bahn reported the results of an internal study conducted by the
NYPD in the 1970s, in which the Department found that, "illicit
police activity is a minor occurrence, but that its frequency is high
enough (12% to 34% in one series of experiments) to warrant
attention."'1 7 The integrity tests in the NYPD in the 1990s did not
uncover many instances of the forms of police corruption the
Department tested for; out of 1,222 police officers tested in 1995, 11
(0.9%) failed the test and were dismissed. A similar percentage failed
the test in 1996 (24 out of 1,320)."8 The degree to which these rates
represent actual rates of corruption depends largely on the quality of
the design of integrity tests, the way they were performed, and the
systems used in the process of target selection.
C. SOCIOLOGICAL FIELD STUDIES
Typical sociological studies of the police are case studies. They
focus on one, or, at best, a few police agencies, and involve a
combination of methods: observation, interviews, analyses of
documents, etc. The potential strength of such studies lies in the fact
that checking and re-checking the information obtained through the
application of various methods increases the internal validity of the
data collected, whereas their inherent limitation is that the depth of
the information required tends to limit the number of agencies
covered by each study and thus puts severe restrictions on the extent
to which the results could be generalized.
Although very few of the existing studies focused primarily on
police corruption, a substantial number of police studies or studies of
Police Department, pointed out that the Philadelphia Police Department performs proactive
investigations of police misconduct. Interview with John J. Norris, Deputy Police
Commissioner, Philadelphia Police Department, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Feb. 24, 2000).
107 Charles Bahn, The Psychology of Police Corruption: Socialization of the Corrupt, 48
POLICEJ. 30, 30-31 (1975) (emphasis added).
"' Vic BAUERIS, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT: PREVENTING CRIME AND CORRUPTION
18 (1997), available at http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au/pub/public/pub2_30cp.pdf.
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communities in general"9 contain community descriptions and depict
the relationship between the police and the community members.
Consequently, they often report about the extent of police corruption
(e.g., routine corruption) and its probable nature (e.g., protection of
illegal activities, including those by racketeers). Typical such studies
include Whyte's study of "Cornerville, '' 0 Gardiner's study of
"Wincanton,"' '1 I or Chambliss's study of "Rainfall West."
' 1 2
The latter is characteristic of community studies; the study
examined the operations of a cabal composed of politicians, law
enforcers, and citizens." 3 After a period of seven years of
interviewing and non-participant observation, Chambliss described
"Rainfall West" as a corrupt city dominated by a complex web of
relationships among legitimate businesses, illegitimate organizations,
local journalists, politicians, and criminal justice personnel. Similar
to the nature and extent of corruption described by the Knapp
Commission 14 and the Pennsylvania Crime Commission..5 in the
1970s, the corruption among police officers in "Rainfall West" was
widespread, highly organized, and had extended to the supervisors:
[l]n this city you must "pay to stay." Mr. Davis said, "You pay for the beat-man
[from the police department] $250.00 per month. That takes care of the various shifts,
and you must pay the upper brass, also $200.00 each month. A beat-man collects
around the first of each month, and another man collects for the upper brass. You get
the privilege to stay in business. That is true; however, you must remember that it is
not what they will do foryou, but what they will do to you, f you don't make these
payoffs as are ordered.
The nature of corruption described by Chambliss included
typical "pads"--protection of illegal activities (e.g., gambling,
prostitution) for a fee and protection of legitimate businesses
violating the law (e.g., restaurants, cabarets, tow-truck operators).
Chambliss wrote:
109 See, e.g., WILLIAM F. WHYTE, STREET CORNER SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
AN ITALIAN SLUM (2d ed., 1955); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966); JOHN A. GARDINER, THE POLITICS OF
CORRUPTION: ORGANIZED CRIME IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1970).
110 WHYTE, supra note 109.
111 GARDINER, supra note 109, at 6-16.
112 William J. Chambliss, Vice, Corruption, Bureaucracy, and Power, 4 WiS. L. Rev.
1150(1971).
113 Id. at 1155.
114 See KNAPP, supra note 20, at 61-192. For a quick summary see id. at 1.
115 See PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 69-448. For a quick summary see id. at 5.
116 Chambliss, supra note 112, at 1162.
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The gambling, prostitution, drug distribution, pornography, and usury which flourish
in the lower class center of the city do so with the compliance, encouragement, and
cooperation of the major political and law enforcement officials in the city. There is in
fact a symbiotic relationship between the law enforcement-political organizations of
the city and a group of local, as distinct from national, men who control the
distribution of vices.
Similarly, the interviews with business owners conducted as a
part of Whyte's study yielded a clear impression about the extent and
nature of police corruption in "Cornerville":
There's only one honest cop down here, one man they can't pay off. That's Sergeant
Clancy. I know. They've offered him hundreds, even thousands, and he won't take the
money. It's a funny thing about that man, they tell me he'll take a bunch of bananas,
groceries, things like that, but he won't take money.118
A second group of studies involved studies of individual police
agencies."9 A study involving non-participant observation and
interviews usually provides a very detailed picture of a particular
agency, but it also tends to be a snapshot, taken at one time and thus
unable to follow dynamic changes in the agency over an extended
period of time. For example, from the time the proposal for a study
on police integrity in Charleston, SC, St. Petersburg, FL, and
Charlotte, NC was submitted to the National Institute of Justice in the
summer of 1995 until the time when the final report was completed
in the fall of 2000, police chiefs in two out of the three agencies had
left. 2 ° Since the police chief, the head administrator in an agency, has
a substantial impact on all aspects of the agency, the two police
agencies in the National Institute of Justice study will probably look
and operate at least somewhat differently under new head
administrators.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice made a push for field studies of the police
in the 1960s and several studies were conducted in conjunction with
the President's Commission. The results of these studies, however,
117 Id. at 1159.
' William F. Whyte, Gambling and the Police in Boston, in POLICE CORRUPTION, supra
note 20, at 108, 120.
119 See, e.g., SKOLNICK, supra note 109; JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1968); ALBERT
J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC (1971); SHERMAN, supra note 19.
20 KLOCKARS ET AL., supra note 30, at 8; Peter E. Howard, Davis, Stephens Assume New
Posts, TAMPA TRIB., June 13, 1997, at 1. For the change in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg PD,
see Stephen Thomson, St. Pete Administrator Wins NC. Police Job, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 26,
1999, at 1.
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did not enable the Commission to detect the extent of police
corruption. The Commission wrote:
The Commission's limited studies afford no basis for general conclusions as to the
exact extent of police dishonesty or the degree to which political corruption affects
police service today. But these studies have shown that even in some of the
departments where the integrity of top administrators is unquestioned, instances of
illegal and unethical conduct are a continuing problem-particularly in slum
areas .... [t]he most common [violations] are improper political influence;
acceptance of gratuities or bribes in exchange for nonenforcement of laws . .. the
"fixing" of traffic tickets; minor thefts; and occasional burglaries.'
21
Originating as one of the studies submitted to the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
Reiss's study of the police role continued beyond the report
submitted to the President's Commission and eventually became one
of the major studies of the police. It gained valuable insight into the
police role through observations of situational transactions and
distributions of surveys to citizens and police officers. 122 Although
some variation was reported across the three selected research sites
(Boston, Chicago, and Washington, D.C.), Reiss indicated that the
rate of crimes by the police officers across the three cities tended to
be of the same magnitude:
Counting all felonies and misdemeanors, except assaults on citizens, the rate of
criminal violation for officers observed committing one or more violations was 23.7
in City X, 21.9 in City Y, and 16.5 in City Z per 100 officers .... Excluding any
participation in syndicated crime, roughly 1 in 5 officers was observed in criminal
violation of the law. There was some variation among the three cities in the crime
patterns of police officers and the rate of violation123
The crime rate per 100 police officers, collected from
observations, self-reports, and allegations of misconduct by other
police officers, is a composite score of various types of crimes. Reiss
provides a list of rates by type of crime/dishonest practice, which
makes it possible to estimate the rate of corrupt criminal violations 124
from the overall rate. 25 The rates of corrupt behavior per 100 police
121 THE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 208.
122 REISS, supra note 119.
123 Id. at 156.
124 Types of violations from the list that can be classified as corruption include: "officer
accepts money to alter testimony report," "officer receives money/merchandise on return of
stolen property," "officer takes money/property from deviants," "traffic violation: officer
gives no citation and gets money," "officer takes merchandise from burglarized
establishment," and "officer receives money or merchandise from a business." Id. at 157-59.
125 id.
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officers (calculated from the data provided in Reiss's book)1 26 were
22.8 in City X, 20.5 in City Y, and 15.6 in City Z. Therefore, these
results of observations by the researchers, self-reports by police
officers, and allegations of misconduct by others suggest that one out
of five police officers engaged in serious, criminal forms of
corruption.
Among the less serious forms of corruption, observations of
police conduct clearly indicate that the acceptance ef gratuities and
free meals was common; even while the observers were present,1 21
31% of the observed police officers did not pay for their meals. 28
Self-reported surveys of citizens led toward a similar conclusion:
Within each of the cities, one-third (31 percent) of all businessmen in wholesale or
retail trade or business and repair services in the high-crime areas openly
acknowledged favors to policemen. Of those giving favors, 43 percent said they gave
free merchandise, food or services to all policemen; the reminder did so at a
discount.'
29
The only study of police corruption was conducted by Sherman
in the 1970s. ° The study focused not on police corruption per se, but
on the role a scandal plays in the control of police corruption and the
reform of a police agency. Instead of measuring the extent and nature
of police corruption, Sherman tried to "measure changes over time in
the quantity of organization generally present in corruption
activities"'' (i.e., organization of corruption) in four cities: New
York, NY, Oakland, CA, Newburgh, NY, and "Central City."
Successful reform, according to Sherman, results in a change from
the organizational deviance by the agency ("collective rule-breaking
action that helps achieve organizational goals") into the deviance in
the agency ("individual or collective rule-breaking action that does
not help achieve organizational goals, or that is harmful to those
goals").12
126 Id.
127 As is common with ethnographic studies, the presence of the observers might have
had an impact on the police officers' behavior. In particular, police officers might have been
more reluctant to engage in corrupt activities or any other form of misconduct punishable by
the agency while their behavior was observed by a researcher.
128 REiSS, supra note 119, at 161-162.
129 Id. at 161.
130 SHERMAN, supra note 19.
131 Id. at 188.
132 Id. at 4.
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The collection of the data sources used in Sherman's study is
substantial; in addition to interviewing members of the agencies,
Sherman used "newspapers accounts, criminal trials, complaints sent
to the police executive, corruption investigation files, interviews with
outside observers close to police affairs during the entire period of
the study, and some other sources." '133 The reliability of the study was
further enhanced by the fact that the target of the study was the
direction of the change, rather than the actual magnitude of the
change.
The index of positive change in the level of corrupt cooperation
was constructed using four indicators: active cooperation (size of the
corruption groups),1 34 passive cooperation (diversity of corruption
arrangements, the total number of arrangements and events, and the
highest rank of the corrupt officers), cooperation between citizens
and the police (ratio of the number of types of vice protection to the
number of types of police-initiated crimes, ratio of the types of
consenting corruption to the types of victimizing corruption), and the
duration of cooperation (ratio of arrangements to events and ratio of
arrangement types to event types). 35 Focusing on the direction of
change in these indicators, Sherman reported that a successful reform
changes the nature of corruption from the corruption endorsed by the
agency to the corruption condoned by the agency.
D. BLUE-RIBBON COMMISSIONS
A typical blue-ribbon commission is formed as a reaction to a
scandal that developed in the aftermath of public revelations of
corruption allegations. 3 6 Its general purpose is to determine the
actual corruption, find factors contributing toward corruption in an
agency, and propose solutions for reform. These tasks rest on
corruption investigation, "one of the most difficult investigative tasks
which any law enforcement agency can undertake."' 3
7
133 Id. at 190.
134 The size of the groups with two or more members decreased in the post-scandal
periods. Id. at 228.
" id. at 195-202.
136 See, e.g., KNAPP, supra note 20, at 35-6; PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 41;
MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 1; G.E. FITZGERALD, QUEENSLAND COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO
POSSIBLE ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATIONS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT, REPORT OF A
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PURSUANT TO ORDERS IN COUNCIL (1989) [hereinafter
FITZGERALD].
137 PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 31.
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The work of blue-ribbon commissions can be challenging in
light of their lack of political independence; for example, the
Pennsylvania Crime Commission suffered because it was "never able
to remove completely the taint of conducting a politically inspired
investigation. ' Depending on the level of political independence,'
39
support from the city and the police administrator, and the actual
tasks assigned, commissions can vary greatly in their view about
police corruption, available resources, " ' and the energy devoted to
the search for patterns of corruption (instead of individual cases),'14
all of which can affect their ability to measure corruption.
The level of legal authority given to the commission is one of
the instrumental tools for overcoming the power of the code of
silence and the reluctance of police officers to provide information.
Indeed, when a commission has the power to grant immunity and
issue subpoenas, chances increase that it will get a more accurate
estimate of the extent and nature of the corruption problem. 4 '
However, as the Pennsylvania Crime Commission had discovered,
having the power to subpoena witnesses and grant immunity is not in
itself a guarantee of actually obtaining truthful testimony.'
43
The ability to enlist experienced police investigators contributes
toward the accuracy of corruption estimates. However, while a
decision to use former police officers from the agency under
investigation is beneficial because it provides internal information
about corruption in the agency, 44 it is at the same time risky because
138 Id. at 754.
139 For example, Chin argued that the investigation of the Lexow Committee in 1895
might have been politically motivated. Gabriel J. Chin, Series Introduction to NEW YORK
CITY POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS 1894-1994, xliv (1997).
140 Unlike the Knapp Commission, which had support from the city, the Pennsylvania
Crime Commission experienced serious problems. In fact, even the constitutionality of its
formation was challenged. Difficulties later presented themselves in the course of finding
investigators, administrative support, and equipment. See PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at
762.
14 1 For example, the Mollen Commission reported that their focus was on patterns, rather
than on individual cases, MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 13.
142 For a long time, the Knapp Commission did not have the power to compel testimony
by granting immunity to police officers KNAPP, supra note 20, at 44.
143 PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 741.
144 For example, the Mollen Commission wrote that they relied on the information
provided by their senior investigators who were former members of the NYPD. MOLLEN,
supra note 3, at 11. Similarly, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission reported that the
Commission "was fortunate in obtaining the services of some above average investigators,
who, by the end of the investigation, had provided valuable background knowledge of the
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the investigators' relationships with the current members of the
agency may still exist.
141
I focus on the three most influential commissions that
investigated allegations of corruption in the United States over the
last three decades: the Knapp Commission, 46 the Pennsylvania Crime
Commission, 147 and the Mollen Commission,1 4' and the two most
recent Australian commissions: the Fitzgerald Commission 149 and the
Royal Commission. 5 ' A common feature of each of the independent
commissions 5' is that, just like sociological field studies, they relied
on a combination of data collection techniques and multiple sources.
Unlike sociologists, who focus on a particular subject matter and do
not persist if they are denied access to a particular location, 52
independent commissions, formed with the purpose of investigating a
particular agency, have the advantage of the legal authority necessary
to gain access to at least some data sources. 5 '
The extent and nature of corruption reported by various
commissions varied from widespread corruption of the "grass-eating"
variety (which included supervisors as well) in the 1970s (Knapp
Commission,1 4 Pennsylvania Crime Commission'), to the less
Department and were instrumental in developing the Commission's two best police
witnesses." PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 763.
145 The Pennsylvania Crime Commission elaborated on this problem:
[Alny agency choosing to hire former officers of the Department under investigation should be
aware of the potential hazards. A corruption probe assignment given to an investigator with
former ties with the Department under scrutiny places the investigator in a potentially difficult
and vulnerable conflict position. Unfair pressures can be brought to bear, because many of the
investigator's friends and family may have ongoing relationships with the unit under
investigation.
PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 763.
146 KNAPP, supra note 20.
147 PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20.
148 MOLLEN, supra note 3.
149 FITZGERALD, supra note 136.
150 ROYAL COMMISSION INTO THE NEW SOUTH WALES POLICE SERVICE (1997) (J.R.T.
Wood, Chair) [hereinafter ROYAL].
... See infra tbl.2.
152 For example, although the NYPD was included in the original design of Reiss's
LEAA-sponsored study of three agencies, the reluctance by Commissioner Howard Leary to
cooperate prompted the researchers to substitute Boston for New York. SIMPSON, supra note
18, at 65.
153 On the other hand, the Knapp Commission did not have the necessary legal authority
for a long time. KNAPP, supra note 20, at 44.
154 KNAPP, supra note 20
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frequent but more aggressive forms of corruption discovered by the
Mollen Commission 15 6 in the 1990s. Of course, being formed as an
outcome of a scandal that resulted from public allegations of
corruption, independent commissions are bound to find corruption
ranging somewhere from the isolated or widespread-less-serious to
the more-concentrated-more-serious forms of corruption.
How accurately do these findings, limited to a particular police
agency and a time period, match the actual nature and extent of
corruption? The use of extensive resources and the reliance on
multiple data sources (e.g., police officers, citizens, and informers)
increase the probability that the commission's findings may serve to
form reasonably close estimates. However, the corruption picture
painted by an independent commission does not necessarily mean
that the commission "got it right"; political pressures, limited
resources and authority, ability and skill to "turn" police officers,
selection of a particular definition of corruption, and the search for
behavior of a pre-determined nature, can each cause the findings to
differ from reality by a substantial margin.
For example, the Knapp Commission reported finding
predominantly widespread corruption of the "grass-eater" variety.
David Burnham, a well-known Pulitzer-prize winning journalist
whose article in the New York Times triggered the establishment of
the Knapp Commission, noted that the Knapp Commission was just
beginning to discover more serious and violent forms of corruption
when the necessary funds were depleted and the Commission
suspended its activities.57
E. INTERNAL AGENCY RECORDS
The next level of corruption measurement is tied to the internal
formal system of control. 58 For example, there were approximately
2,700 allegations of police corruption recorded annually by the New
York Police Department (a department of 35,000 police officers) in
the early 1990s,159 decreasing gradually to 1,922 in 1995 and 1,726 in
1996.16' Are these numbers-amounting to the annual rate of 5 to 8
155 PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20.
156 MOLLEN, supra note 3.
157 Interview with David Burnham, in Washington, D.C. (May 22, 2000).
158 See supra fig. I.
159 MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 87.
160 BAUERIS, supra note 108, at 18.
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allegations per 100 police officers-an accurate estimate of the actual
level of corruption in the NYPD?
Although potentially useful in estimating the actual extent and
nature of police corruption, the numbers recorded in the internal
formal system are far better representations of the agency's overall
efforts to control corruption and the public sentiment toward the
police than of the actual level of corruption.161 For the reasons
described below, even in the best agencies the number and nature of
actual cases of corruption and those recorded by the agency's internal
system will differ extensively.
Corruption cases begin through either internally or externally
generated complaints. Complaints of corruption typically constitute a
small part of the overall complaints filed.162 As argued earlier,
citizens who willingly engaged in corruption have no motive to
report their own involvement nor to report the involvement of their
partners in crime-police officers. Citizens who were less willing
participants in the transaction or who just observed a corrupt
transaction performed by somebody else may decide not to report
because they can be either fearful of retribution 63 or have no
161 Perez wrote about the factors that influence complaint rates:
Comparing numbers across jurisdiction is extremely problematic, however. This may be because
of differences in citizen perceptions of police officer conduct, variations in media coverage (or
lack of coverage), malpractice, extreme diversity in the socioeconomic makeup of the local
population, and so forth. People who are more educated, more economically secure, more
socially elevated in station, and more adept at dealing with powerful governmental actors tend to
complain less.
Other factors influence complaint statistics. Differences in complaint input structures can affect
complaint numbers greatly.
DOUGLAS W. PEREZ, COMMON SENSE ABOUT POLICE REVIEW 28-29 (1994).
162 For example, according to the NYPD cohort data collected by Cohen, allegations of
corruption constituted 7.4% of all allegations-144 allegations of corruption out of 1938
allegations. Bernard Cohen, The Police Internal System of Justice in New York City, 63 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sc. 54, 66 (1972). The percentage appears to have been
similar three decades later; the Internal Affairs Bureau received approximately 17,000 calls
(complaints) in 1996 and had 1,726 corruption cases recorded. BAUERIS, supra note 108, at
18. The Royal Commission in Australia provided the complaint data according to which the
corruption allegations constituted between 2.6-3.7% of the complaints, depending on the
period. ROYAL, supra note 150, at 161.
163 This fear can be far from exaggeration as the reaction by the police can be very
retaliatory. The President's Commission reported in 1967 that approximately 40% of persons
who filed complaints were arrested for filing false charges in one large eastern city. THE
TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 195. The Knapp Commission reported the case of a restaurant
owner who was victimized by the police in retaliation for discontinuing completely free
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confidence in the police in general. Similarly, police officers have no
reason to report their own misconduct and get disciplined or even
dismissed. Moreover, their own involvement in misconduct, the code
of silence, and the lack of incentives for reporting provide motives
for police officers not to report corrupt behavior by their fellow
officers. Furthermore, for as long as the public views corruption
through the "rotten-apple" lens, unless especially interested in
learning about the patterns of corruption in order to control it, a
typical agency has incentives neither to encourage citizens to file
complaints nor to investigate complaints diligently.164
The results of several quantitative studies and investigations
clearly support these arguments. Of all the respondents to the
International Crime Victim Survey in 1996/1997 who said that they
had been asked to pay a bribe to a police officer last year165 (Table 1),
less than 5% in each country 166 said that they reported the act to the
police. In other words, over 95% of the people who reported being
asked to pay a bribe did not report the activity to the police. A survey
of police officers-the other side in the corrupt transaction-
suggested a similar conclusion about the likelihood of reporting a
corrupt transaction. Indeed, the Royal Commission wrote: "many of
the same officers acknowledged that ... they had been involved in
cases of assault or larceny when no complaint had been made;
and... in the case of the larceny of drugs or money taken from those
suspected of criminal activity, they did not expect any complaint.' 167
Another approach is to compare the rates of complaints and their
nature with the expected rates and nature of complaints based on the
findings of a reliable source. For example, based on the findings of
the Knapp Commission that suggested unequal distribution of corrupt
activities across precincts, Meyer examined the relation between
reported corruption and the areas producing it, 68 and concluded that
meals for them when he introduced a modest delivery charge for these free meals. KNAPP,
supra note 20, at 173.
164 The accusations of the lack of eagerness and diligence with which police agencies
investigated citizens' complaints presented a strong voice for the establishment of citizen
review boards. See SAMUEL WALKER, CITIZEN REVIEW RESOURCE MANUAL 3 (1995).
165 See supra tbl. 1.
166 The only exception is Bolivia, where 7% of the respondents who reported paying a
bribe to a police officers said that they reported it to the police. See infra Part II.A.3.
167 ROYAL, supra note 150, at 160.
168 JOHN C. MEYER, JR., COMPLAINTS OF POLICE CORRUPTION 21-22 (1977).
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examining only the complaint rates leads toward a distorted picture
of the extent of corruption.'69
A comparison between the Knapp Commission's findings of
widespread corruption and the results of Cohen's study, 7 ° which
suggested that approximately at the same time there were low rates of
corruption complaints against a cohort of police officers (nine per
100 police officers over a eleven-year period or less than one per 100
police officers annually), clearly illustrates the perils of relying on
complaints to measure the extent of corruption. Indeed, while even
the Knapp Commission's rates can easily be underestimates of the
true extent and nature of corruption, the results of Cohen's analysis
(based on the agency's disciplinary records) appear to be even further
removed from reality. While discussing the possibility of measuring
the extent of corruption through official disciplinary records,
Simpson concluded:
However, the major limitation of Cohen's study is that no way exists of knowing just
how accurately the number of officers accused or convicted of corruption reflects the
number actually engaged in such practices. From the allegations made against the
New York City Police Department at the time Cohen's study was published, his
figures apparently bear little relationship to reality as indicators of the true level of
corrupt activity.
169 Meyer concluded:
Complaints may be deficient when used as the source of information on where corruption
occurs, because it appears that areas are underreporting certain types of corruption. However,
when used as a measure of the reporting process itself, complaints may have value far beyond
merely mapping the distribution of alleged corruption.
Id. at 21-22.
70 Cohen reported that there were 144 allegations of corruption recorded in eleven years
against the examined cohort of 1,915 police officers (1,608 in an active cohort) in the
NYPD. Cohen, supra note 162, at 66. This yields a rate of seven allegations per 100 police
officers over a period of eleven years.
171 SIMPSON, supra note 18, at 57.
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A more current comparison of the findings of the Mollen
Commission and the NYPD's allegations of corruption further
supports this statement. The findings of the Mollen Commission
indicated the presence of small groups of police officers engaging in
aggressive forms of corruption and crime in general. The rate of eight
corruption complaints per 100 officers per year7 2 may not be
perceived as particularly low for a department in which the majority
of police officers are not corrupt, but, because of the nature of their
crimes, the corrupt officers probably generated a large number of
complaints and the resulting rates should have been considerably
higher. The cover-up activities by the Department discovered by the
Mollen Commission173 lend support to this hypothesis.
Another set of very strong reasons why the official internal rates
are at best problematic estimates of the actual corruption is related to
the agency's procedures and practices of handling complaints. Police
agencies are not always eager to actively pursue corruption
complaints, and the reasons underlying such decisions and the
techniques used to sweep complaints under the rug vary greatly.
Therefore, when citizens decide to file a complaint, even several
complaints against the same police officer (sometimes as many as
seventeen, as was the case for one corrupt police officer in New
York),174 the agency can ignore the problem completely and
consequently discourage the less persistent complainants.
Procedures vary extensively;175 the overall trend for police
agencies is to substantiate a small percentage of all complaints'76 and
172 The Mollen Commission reported that there were approximately 2,700 corruption
allegations filed with the NYPD each year. MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 87. Since the
Department had approximately 35,000 officers, that yields the rate of eight complaints per
100 officers.
173 Id.
171 Id. at 14.
175 Pate and Hamilton concluded in their seminal research on six large police agencies in
the United States-known as the "Big Six"-that "methods of filing and investigating
complaints vary notably across departments. As a result, data concerning the disposition of
complaints are not comparable ... " ANTONY M. PATE & EDWIN E. HAMILTON, THE BIG SIX:
POLICING AMERICA'S LARGEST CITIES 142 (1991). Perez also emphasized problems of the
cross-jurisdictional comparisons:
Differences in complaint input structures can affect complaint numbers greatly. Some review
systems allow a great deal of latitude within which to deal with complaints informally. In such
locations, such as in Los Angeles during the 1980s, complaint numbers appear inordinately low,
because only those complaints that cannot be dealt with informally turn into statistics for review.
PEREZ, supra note 161, at 28-29.
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thus to (un)intentionally discourage further complaints. For example,
while the Mollen Commission found small groups of NYPD police
officers engaging in aggressive and serious corrupt activities, at the
same time, out of the 5% of the most serious corruption allegations
retained for investigation by the Internal Affairs Division, over 60%
were closed as unsubstantiated.'77 Therefore, relying on the data
about internal discipline for corrupt behavior in the process of
estimating the extent and nature of corruption is also highly
problematic. "'
F. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The next level at which estimates about the actual corruption
seemingly can be made is the formal criminal justice system: cases
referred for prosecution, cases prosecuted, cases with convictions,
and cases with imprisonment.'79 Cases are referred for prosecution
from various sources: individual citizens, federal investigative
agencies (e.g., FBI, IRS), t ° local investigators (e.g., local police),
and other governmental institutions (e.g., INS), as well as
independent commissions.' 8
One of the most prolific sources of referrals for the police
corruption cases should be the police agency itself. Yet, in addition to
176 Starting from the President's Commission in 1967, which reported that 50% of the
departments sustained 10% of complaints or less, THE TASK FORCE, supra note 12, at 196, a
common finding across the studies is that the rate of sustained complaints is generally
between 0% and 25%. PATE & HAMILTON, supra note 179, at 42. The national average of
sustained cases across municipal law enforcement agencies is only 10.1%. PATE, ET. AL.,
supra note 30, at 113-20.
177 MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 88.
178 For example, Cohen reported that there were 144 corruption complaints against 1,608
NYPD police officers from the same cohort. Cohen, supra note 162, at 62. Out of these,
only 16% were brought to the departmental trial, resulting in mostly minor discipline or no
discipline at all: "dispositions of complaints dismissed, reprimand, probation, filed and
minor fine." Id. at 64.
179 See supra fig. 1.
180 For example, Donald Hersing, an owner of a house of prostitution, filed a complaint
with the FBI, which resulted in the thorough investigation of the Philadelphia Police
Department. John Dombrink, The Touchables. Vice and Police Corruption in the 1980s, 51
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201, 212 (1988).
181 For example, the Knapp Commission referred a certain number of cases for
prosecution. KNAPP, supra note 20, at 250.
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the possibly heavy workload of the internal affairs investigators,' 82 a
typical police agency not only lacks motives to investigate
complaints diligently and refer cases of police officers who violated
penal statutes to the prosecutors, but actually has incentives to
conceal cases.' 83 Although not all corruption cases are of such
seriousness that they need to be referred for prosecution, it is still not
realistic to expect that the number of serious corruption cases and the
number of referrals would be the same. The question thus is not
whether they differ, but what the magnitude of that difference is.
On the other end, the recipients of information concerning
corruption are prosecutors, who, just like police departments, can
also be less than eager to prosecute cases of police corruption. State
and local prosecutors develop a long-term relationship with the
police officers because they need to rely on their help in the
investigation of all criminal cases. Although wrong from the integrity
standpoint, and possibly leading toward both problems with the
police officer's credibility in subsequent court cases and future
problems with the prosecutor's own career, a prosecutor can perceive
overlooking a bribery case by a known police officer as beneficial to
maintaining a good working relationship with the police agency
(unless, of course, the agency's administration and police officers
condemn the corrupt act by the police officer, in which case such
considerations are less pressing for the prosecutor). Furthermore,
local prosecutors cannot count on federal investigative agencies-to
step into every corruption case. Instead, they may have to rely on the
local police to investigate their fellow officers.
While there are no nationwide data available for state
prosecutions of police corruption cases, comparing the available data
on state prosecutions with the findings of independent commissions
about the nature and extent of corruption (under the assumption that
the findings of independent commissions were in the worst case only
underestimates of the actual corruption) helps in assessing the degree
to which the pictures of corruption in the agency painted by these two
sources overlap and thus inferring the precision with which statistics
182 The Mollen Commission reported a considerable discrepancy in the workloads
between the central internal affairs unit (lAD) and the decentralized units (FIAUs); while the
lAD investigators had a workload of two cases per year, while the FIAU investigators had an
average of eighteen cases per investigator. MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 85-86.
183 For example, the Mollen Commission reported finding 230 cases of serious
corruption concealed by the NYPD. MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 96-98.
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on state prosecutions of corruption cases could serve as a tool for the
measurement of corruption.
Both the Knapp Commission'84 and the Pennsylvania Crime
Commission.85 in the 1970s found corruption of a "grass-eating"
variety to be widespread and to involve supervisors. Compared to
their findings, the numbers of prosecutions and convictions tended to
be quite low, thus showing, as the Knapp Commission wrote, "that
the risks of severe punishment for corrupt behavior are slight."'86 In
particular, the Knapp Commission reported that in the four and one
half year period the Commission focused on prosecutors initiated
only 136 cases involving 218 defendants (approximately thirty cases
per year) from the NYPD, the largest police department in the
country.'87 Among the 137 completed cases, one-third were
dismissed or acquitted, while two-thirds (ninety-one) either pleaded
guilty or were convicted. Among those sentenced, the majority (61%)
were either set free or given suspended sentences. In the end, only
one out of five police officers sentenced for corruption received a
prison sentence in excess of one year of imprisonment.'88
Similarly, the Pennsylvania Crime Commission reported that in
the department of 8,303 sworn police officers' 89 in 1974 there were
only forty-three arrests for police corruption over a six-year period
(1968-1973), an average of seven per year. 9' Moreover, almost one-
half of the arrests were made in one year, as a consequence of a
statement by one police officer. Of the sentenced police officers, two
out of five were sentenced to prison.19
These numbers clearly indicate that relying on prosecution and
conviction rates as estimates of the extent of corruption at best
uncovers the tip of the iceberg. Although, as the Mollen Commission
indicated for New York,'92 both federal and local prosecutors may
have become less reluctant to prosecute corrupt police officers in the
1990s, a few studies indicate that state and federal prosecutors can
actually have different levels of activity. Upon engaging in a case
184 KNAPP, supra note 20, at 4.
185 PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20.
186 KNAPP, supra note 20, at 252.
187 id.
188 id.
189 PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20, at 52.
'90 Id. at 446.
191 Id.
192 MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 150.
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study of the Philadelphia Police Department, Dombrink concluded:
"[C]ompared with federal prosecutors, whose record of thirty-one
convictions in thirty-six federal district court cases between 1983 and
1986 was formidable, local prosecutors had fared less well
historically with police corruption cases in the Pennsylvania
courts."
'1 93
Malec and Gardiner tried to compile all corruption cases
prosecuted in Chicago and Cook County from 1970 to April 1987.194
Their study suggests two important conclusions. First, unlike the
Mollen Commission's conclusions about the prosecutors' eagerness
in New York, the findings obtained by Malec and Gardiner indicate
that prosecutions for police corruption in Chicago were quite rare; in
a police department with over 10,000 sworn police officers,' 95 there
were 114 police corruption cases.96 over a period of sixteen years.
Second, the number of all corruption cases (not just police corruption
cases) prosecuted by federal prosecutors exceeded the number of
corruption cases prosecuted by local prosecutors by a factor of ten
(412 and 40, respectively). 97
One could imagine that obtaining data about police corruption at
the federal level would be possible because of the central role the
Department of Justice plays. Unfortunately, although questionnaires
are sent each year to the U.S. Attorneys' Offices inquiring about the
data on indictments, convictions, and prosecutions awaiting trial, the
available data refer to the federal cases involving abuse of public
office for all governmental employees.' 98 While the classification
"abuse of public office" includes crimes such as bribery, extortion,
and conflict of interest' 99 and, therefore, broadly fits the definition of
corruption, it is not possible to identify only the cases involving
police officers. Although indictments and convictions increased
193 Dombrink, supra note 180, at 211.
194 Kathryn L. Malec & John A. Gardiner, Measurement Issues in the Study of Official
Corruption: A Chicago Example, 2 CORRUPTION & REFORM 267 (1987).
195 The Chicago Police Department had 12,368 sworn police officers in the early 1990s.
U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STATISTICS, 1993: DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES WITH 100 OR MORE
OFFICERS 16 (1995).
196 Malec & Gardiner, supra note 194, at 270.
'9' Id. at 270.
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gradually until 1983 °20 and have oscillated since,20 1 the overall
numbers of between 1,000 and 1,500 indictments and around 1,000
convictions in the last years tend to be rather small in comparison
with the millions of government employees.2 2
Whereas the Department of Justice does not separate cases in the
database based on the occupation of the defendant (thus precluding
the analysis of police corruption cases), it divides all corruption cases
into seven program categories, only one of which potentially refers to
police corruption: federal law enforcement corruption. 3 According
to the data obtained from the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, referrals for prosecution were most frequently made
by the FBI, the Customs Service, and the IRS. Most referrals were
eventually declined2 4 because of "weak or insufficient evidence,"
"lack of evidence of criminal intent," or because "no federal offense
was evident." The charge in at least one-half of the cases was
violation of Title 18 Section 201 (bribery). Most defendants pleaded
guilty (89.8%), the overall conviction rate for the cases prosecuted
was above 66%,"5 and approximately one-half of the persons
sentenced were sentenced to a prison term °.2 6 The key lesson about
prosecutions of federal law-enforcement-corruption cases is that
there were so few prosecutions each year (thirty-five to seventy,
depending on the year) that one should not give serious consideration
to taking these prosecutions or convictions as estimates of the actual
extent of corruption. Rather, one of the primary functions of these
data could be to gauge the degree of interest the Department of
Justice has in corruption issues.
200 Burnham argued that the increase in the number of cases was due to several factors:
"But with the aggressive legal expansionism of Lacey and Thompson, the public dismay
over the Watergate scandals, the formal establishment of the Public Integrity Section in 1975
and other factors such as the growing national concern about organized crime, federal
prosecutors developed a king of anticorruption fever." DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAW:
SECRET DEALS, POLITICAL FIXES AND OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 327 (1996).
20 See infra fig.2.
202 See BURNHAM, supra note 200, at 327.
203 Although two additional program categories, state and local, may be of interest, I
excluded them from the analysis because the data available at both the state and local level
pertain to all public corruption and it is not possible to isolate only the cases of police
corruption.
204 See infra tbl.3.
205 See infra tbl.3; fig.3.
206 See infra tbl.3.
2003]
SANJA KUTNJAK IVKO VIC
The disadvantages of using the official data as an estimate of the
actual corruption are even more explicit when a comparison of
official corruption data is made across countries."0 7 The United
Nations World Surveys of Crime Trends and Criminal Justice
Systems... provide official data (crimes known to the police,
prosecutions, convictions, sentences) for various types of crimes, one
of which is classified as "bribery/corruption." As discussed earlier,
one of the serious challenges of cross-cultural research is that the
definitions of corrupt behavior differ across legal systems.
Furthermore, the term "bribery/corruption" includes corrupt behavior
by all public officials, not just police officers, as well as corrupt
behavior by the public.
The analysis of the fifth World Survey data °9 provides several
conclusions. First, the rates of official records of bribery and
corruption over a period of five years oscillate within a country,
leading toward tenfold increases or decreases in several countries
(e.g., Ecuador, Republic of Korea, Romania). These abrupt increases
in such a short period of time could not be a result of solely the
changes in the extent of corruption; rather, they are mostly
attributable to other factors, such as changes in the law enforcement
priorities, budget priorities, or political climate. In other words, it is
clear that the noise overpowers the signal.
207 See infra tbl.4.
208 U.N. CRIME & JUSTICE INFO. NETWORK, U.N. SURVEYS ON CRIME TRENDS AND THE
OPERATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (2000), at
http://www.uncj in.org/Statistics/WCTS/wcts.html.
209 See infra tbl.4.
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Data Source: Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online
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Table 3
Prosecutions and Convictions for Federal Law Enforcement
Corruption
1992 [ 1993 1994 [ 1995 1 1996 1997 F1998
R.,erralsforprosecution [ 86 [156 [148 [ 131 137 ]400 1186
Referralsdisposed of [ °110 116 [162 [ 134 114 1346 1 131
Referrals declined 75 80 7[ 86 68 301 67
% of disposed referrals 68.2% 69.0% 72.2% 64.2% 59.6% 87.0% 51.1%
Referrals into prosecution 35 [36 45 [48 T46 ]45 64
%of disposed referrals 31.8% [31.0% 27.8% 35.8% 40.4% 13.0% 48.9%
Convicted after prosecution 34 30 34 44 32 30 50
%of prosecutions 97.1% 83.3% 75.6% 91.7% 69.6% 66.7% 78.1%
% of disposed referrals 30.9% 25.9% 21.0% 32.8% 28.1% 8.7% 38,2%
Sentenced to prison 16 20 19 19 19 ]17 28
% of convictions 47.1% 66.7% 55.9% 43.2% 59.4% 56.7% 56.0%
Data Source: The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
Second, when official records are standardized across countries
(as rates per 100,000 inhabitants), the rates of recorded crimes vary
from close to zero to as many as twenty-four cases per 100,000
inhabitants. Does a higher rate indicate that the corruption is more
widespread, that the law enforcement authorities are dealing with
corruption more diligently, both, or something else? For example,
among the countries with a rate higher than one per 100,000
inhabitants there are countries with a reputation of being relatively
clean of corruption (e.g., Austria, which has a high Corruption
Perceptions Index score of 7.6); in such cases it appears more likely
that the higher rate is a result of the more extensive law enforcement
activity. On the other hand, in some countries with a rate higher than
one per 100,000 inhabitants (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, both of which
had a low Corruption Perceptions Index score of 3.3), the higher rate
of officially recorded corruption probably indicates that the extent of
corruption is wider. Unfortunately, we do not know to what extent
this is true, and, moreover, have no direct way of checking.
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Third, the comparison of the rates spanning from the crimes
known to the police to convictions is equally confusing. 2 " Although
in several countries numbers of cases decrease through the corruption
funnel (Figure 1), the outliers-countries in which the prosecution
numbers far exceed the numbers of the crimes known to the police-
clearly show that factors other than changes in the extent of actual
corruption have a significant impact. What these other factors are and
how strong their impact is remain open questions, but the implication
is that these numbers are not particularly useful in obtaining close
estimates of the actual extent of corruption.
III. CONCLUSION
The first two steps in addressing the problem of police
corruption are defining what constitutes corrupt behavior and seeking
to determine its extent and characteristics. Once a subset of behaviors
is defined as corruption, the next step should be a thorough effort to
measure it (and to continue measuring it). Obtaining accurate
information about the extent and nature of corruption provides
direction for the selection and utilization of appropriate control
mechanisms and identifies problem areas that the control
mechanisms should target. Subsequently, it also facilitates informed
judgment about the effectiveness of the implemented control
mechanisms. In the absence of reasonably accurate estimates of
police corruption, control efforts are selected on the bases of their
general attractiveness and political appeal, and their impact is
evaluated almost solely on the basis of successful avoidance of future
scandals and other political factors.
The pivotal question examined in this paper is how to measure
corruption. Obvious sources of information about police corruption
are those who know about it-police officers, police agencies,
citizens, prosecutors-all of whom (for a variety of reasons) can be
predisposed not only to avoid reporting corruption, but also to
conceal it. Acquiring information from participants in a corrupt
transaction leaves the participants vulnerable to the application of
both informal and formal internal discipline (including dismissal) and
criminal punishment, as well as public disgrace. Obtaining
210 The numbers reported in Table 4 for cases known to the police, suspects,
prosecutions, and convictions in a given year need not necessarily correspond to the same
perpetrators/defendants.
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information from the observers of corrupt activities exposes them to
some risk as well: informal sanctioning for the violation of the code
of silence if they are police officers and fear of reprisal if they are
citizens. Thus, while the participants are the most valuable potential
sources of information because of their closeness to the activity, at
the same time, they usually are the most reluctant ones to discuss the
topic. This simple paradox drives much of the reality of estimating
the extent and nature of police corruption. It is an obvious and severe
limitation. It is also a challenge, as the resulting inability to secure
the flow of information from the participants themselves creates the
need for alternative (though considerably less precise) and often
multiple data sources.
Despite its importance, measurement of the actual level of
corruption is largely impossible and the only pragmatic solution is to
rely on its estimates. The multitude of estimation methods includes
surveys, interviews, observations, experiments, and case studies.
Each of them, regardless of its sophistication, is riddled with inherent
problems and limitations. Indeed, relying on any single methodology
of data collection exposes the resulting estimates to the possibility of
severe errors, which in turn renders the resulting estimates
questionable at best. Setting aside the practical consideration of
necessary resources for a moment, increasing the validity of the
findings (that is, reducing the likely extent of estimation error)
necessitates triangulation-combination of several methods-and
checking whether the findings they produced are similar or at least
consistent. Thus far, with the exception of a few sources, such as
independent commissions and large-scale studies (e.g., the World
Bank Institute project"' or the Reiss study),212 triangulation has been
applied infrequently.
An equally important way of enhancing the validity of the
estimates is to increase the subjects' willingness-be they police
officers, citizens, supervisors, or police administrators-to actually
participate in studies that seek to measure the extent of police
corruption. Indeed, when the response rate (i.e., the ratio of the
number of participants in the study and the number of all subjects
who were invited to participate in the study) increases, the reliability
of the findings likely increases as well. The manner in which
questions are asked could have a substantial impact on the
211 WORLD BANK, CAMBODIA, supra note 87.
212 REISS, supra note 119.
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respondents' willingness to participate and provide answers to
specific queries. Questions asking the respondents to report their own
corrupt behavior or corrupt behavior of their colleagues will be met
with greater resistance than the questions that do not "put them on the
spot." For instance, government officials in the World Bank Institute
survey were asked about the situations in which they were offered
bribes, while the citizens were asked about the instances in which
they were requested to pay bribes to the governmental officials."'
Enhancing the willingness to participate in the study needs to go
beyond simple methodological steps of repeated mailings and design
of appealing questionnaire booklets; it should consist of a series of
activities oriented toward building a positive environment for such a
project, including raising public awareness about the benefits and
public acceptance of such endeavors, protecting and rewarding
project participants willing to share information, as well as
stimulating and rewarding supervisors and administrators willing to
conduct the study themselves, to open their doors to someone else
managing the project, and to publicly share the findings.
Reliance on official records, be they internal agency records or
the official criminal justice records, is quite appropriate for the
analysis of changes in the law-enforcement policy on corruption,
budget allocation, or interest in corruption, but, as the analyses of the
official records suggest, largely inappropriate as the bases for the
estimates of police corruption. Indeed, whether a particular corrupt
act will become a part of the official statistics is affected by a series
of factors, such as suitability of the legal definition of corruption,
reluctance of police officers to give eyewitness testimony in the case,
change in the unofficial stance on corruption tolerance, eagerness of
police administrators to enter the case into the official statistics, or
increased public pressure to address the mounting corruption
problem. These factors could have a stronger impact on the official
corruption statistics than on the changes in the actual levels of
corruption.
Technical and substantive issues regarding measurement of
police corruption aside, two common themes emerge from the
discussion in this paper. First, results of various studies seeking to
estimate corruption suggest that the extent of corruption seems to
diverge substantially across time and place. For example, while the
Knapp Commission in the 1970s reported that police corruption was
213 WORLD BANK, CAMBODIA, supra note 87.
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widespread in the NYPD,214 the Mollen Commission, investigating
the same police agency two decades later, reported that corruption
was rather limited to several groups of police officers." 5
Furthermore, as the ICVS data indicate,216 police corruption seems to
be substantially more prevalent in East European, Asian, and Latin
American countries than in Western democracies.
Second, although the variance with which certain types of police
corruption217 are represented across police agencies might be quite
extensive, estimates from a divergent set of sources tend to suggest a
common thread: the less serious forms of corruption seem to be more
widespread than the more severe forms. For example, police officers
in both the Illinois and the Ohio studies"' reported observing the
more serious forms of corruption, such as opportunistic thefts and
direct criminal activities, much less frequently than observing the less
serious forms, such as corruption of authority. However, this
comforting notion has been challenged by some recent accounts of
police corruption, such as the Mollen Commission Report219
(investigating corruption in the NYPD) and the Los Angeles Police
Department Board of Inquiry Report2. (investigating corruption in
the Rampart Division within the LAPD), which suggest that the less
serious "grass-eating" variety of corruption, widespread in
Philadelphia22 and New York in the 1970s, seems to be replaced by
the more serious and aggressive "meat-eating" variety of corruption
in the 1990s.
In sum, although not without drawbacks, the best approach to
the measurement of the extent and nature of police corruption at this
point is triangulation-the application of a combination of various
methods. Of course, learning about the extent and nature of the
214 See KNAPP, supra note 20, at 1.
215 See MOLLEN, supra note 3, at 1.
216 See Kutnjak lvkovi6, supra note 75.
217 Roebuck and Barker developed a typology of police corruption based on the five
dimensions: "(1) acts and actors; (2) norm violations; (3) support from peer group; (4)
organizational degree of deviant practices; and (5) police department's reactions." Julian B.
Roebuck & Thomas Barker, A Typology of Police Corruption, 21 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 423
(1974). They included eight types of police corruption in their typology: corruption of
authority, kickbacks, opportunistic theft, shakedowns, protection of illegal activities, the fix,
direct criminal activities, and internal payoffs.
218 See MARTIN, supra note 17, at 33; KNOWLES, supra note 40.
219 MOLLEN, supra note 3.
220 BOARD OF INQUIRY, supra note I.
221 PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 20; KNAPP, supra note 20.
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problem is merely the first, yet crucial step toward successful
corruption control. Reliable estimates are a helpful tool in
determining whether the level and nature of corruption is within the
acceptable boundaries and in selecting the applicable control
methods, as well as in providing a more precise measure of their
success than the simple absence of a subsequent scandal. Whether
this information will be collected at all and how it will be used
depends upon the citizens, city officials, and police administrators. If
the citizens perceive police officers to be corrupt and continue to give
them a positive "report card," the public implicitly chooses to
maintain an environment tolerant of corruption. Ultimately, it is up to
the citizens, city officials, and police administrators to determine
what the acceptable level of corruption is in an agency and to seek to
control police corruption effectively.
650 SANJA KUTNJAK IVKOVIC [Vol. 93
